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ABSTRACT
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles are expected to place a consid-
erable strain on local electricity distribution networks, requiring
charging to be coordinated in order to accommodate capacity con-
straints. We design a novel online auction protocol for this prob-
lem, wherein vehicle owners use agents to bid for power and also
state time windows in which a vehicle is available for charging.
This is a multi-dimensional mechanism design domain, with own-
ers having non-increasing marginal valuations for each subsequent
unit of electricity. In our design, we couple a greedy allocation al-
gorithm with the occasional “burning” of allocated power, leaving
it unallocated, in order to adjust an allocation and achieve mono-
tonicity and thus truthfulness. We consider two variations: burning
at each time step or on-departure. Both mechanisms are evaluated
in depth, using data from a real-world trial of electric vehicles in
the UK to simulate system dynamics and valuations. The mecha-
nisms provide higher allocative efﬁciency than a ﬁxed price system,
are almost competitive with a standard scheduling heuristic which
assumes non-strategic agents, and can sustain a substantially larger
number of vehicles at the same per-owner fuel cost saving than a
simple random scheme.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [AI]: Distributed AI - multiagent systems
General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Economics
Keywords
electric vehicle, mechanism design, pricing
1. INTRODUCTION
Promoting the use of electric vehicles (EVs) is a key element in
many countries’ initiatives to transition to a low carbon economy
[4]. Recent years have seen rapid innovation within the automo-
tive industry [10], with designs such as plug-in hybrid vehicles
(PHEVs, which have both an electric motor and an internal com-
bustion engine) and range-extended electric vehicles (which have
an electric motor and an on-board generator driven by an internal
combustion engine) promising to overcome consumers’ range anx-
iety
1 and thereby increasing mainstream EV use
2. However, there
1Fear that a car will run out of electricity in the middle of nowhere.
2The Toyota ‘plug-in’ Prius and the Chevrolet Volt are commercial
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are signiﬁcant concerns within the electricity distribution industries
regardingthewidespreaduseofsuchvehicles, sincethehighcharg-
ing rates that these vehicles require (up to three times the maximum
current demand of a typical home) could overload local electricity
distribution networks at peak times [5]. Indeed, street-level trans-
formers servicing between 10-200 homes may become signiﬁcant
bottlenecks in the widespread adoption of EVs [11].
Toaddress these concerns, electricity distributioncompanies that
are already seeing signiﬁcant EV use (such as the Paciﬁc Gas and
Electric Company in California) have introduced time-of-use pric-
ing plans for electric vehicle charging that attempt to dissuade own-
ers from charging their vehicles at peak times, when the local elec-
tricity distribution network is already close to capacity
3. While
such approaches are easily understood by customers, they fail to
fully account for the constraints on the local distribution networks,
andtheyarenecessarilystaticsincetheyrequirethatvehicleowners
individually respond to this price signal and adapt their behaviour
(i.e., manually changing the time at which they charge their vehi-
cle). Looking further ahead, researchers have also begun to investi-
gate the automatic scheduling of EV charging. Typically, this work
allows individual vehicle owners to indicate the times at which the
car will be available for charging, allowing automatic scheduling
while satisfying the constraints of the distribution network [15, 2].
However, since these approaches separate the scheduling of the
charging from the price paid for the electricity (typically assuming
a ﬁxed per unit price plan), they are unable to preclude the incentive
to misreport (e.g., an owner may indicate an earlier departure time
or further travel distances in order to receive preferential charging).
To address the above shortcomings, we turn to the ﬁeld of online
mechanism design [12]. Speciﬁcally, we focus on mechanisms that
are model-free (which make no assumptions about future demand
and supply of electricity), and that allocate resources as they be-
come available (electricity is perishable since installing alternative
storage capacity can be very costly). Now, existing mechanisms of
this kind assume that the preferences of the agents (representing the
vehicle owners) can be described by a single parameter, so-called
single-valued domains. However, this assumption is not appropri-
ate for our problem, where agents have multi-unit demand with
marginal non-increasing valuations for incremental kilowatt hours
(kWh) of electricity.
4 To this end, we extend the state of the art in
dynamic mechanism design as follows:
examples of both, which will be on the road in 2011.
3See for example www.pge.com/about/environment/
pge/electricvehicles/fuelrates/.
4Marginal valuations are non-increasing in our domain because
distance and energy usage are uncertain, and therefore the ﬁrst few
units of electricity are more likely to be used, and (in the case of
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) any shortfall can be made up by
using the vehicle’s internal combustion engine.• We develop a formal framework and solution for the EV
charging problem, and show that it can be naturally modeled
as an online mechanism design problem where agents have
multi-unit demand with non-increasing marginal valuations.
• We develop the ﬁrst model-free online mechanism for per-
ishable goods, where agents have multi-unit demand with
decreasing marginal valuations. To ensure truthfulness, we
show that this mechanism occasionally requires units to re-
main unallocated (we say that these units are ‘burned’), even
if there is demand for these units. This burning can be done
in two ways: at the time of allocation, or on departure of the
agent. The latter results in higher allocative efﬁciency and
allocations are easier to compute, but occasionally requires
the battery to be discharged which may not always be feasi-
ble in practice. Both variants are (weakly) dominant-strategy
incentive compatible (DSIC), which means that no agent has
an incentive to misreport their demand vector and the vehicle
availability, regardless of the others’ reports.
• We evaluate our mechanism through numerical simulation of
electric vehicle charging using vehicle use data taken from a
recent trial of EVs in the UK. In doing so, we show how the
agent valuations can be derived from real monetary costs to
thevehicleowners, byconsideringfactorssuchasfuelprices,
the distance that the owner expects to travel, and the energy
efﬁciency of the vehicle. Experiments conducted in this re-
alistic setting show that the mechanism with on-departure
burning is highly scalable (it can handle hundreds of agents),
and both variants outperform any ﬁxed price mechanism for
this problem in terms of allocative efﬁciency, while perform-
ing only slightly worse than a well known scheduling heuris-
tic, which assumes non-strategic agents.
Throughout this paper, we focus on measuring allocative efﬁciency
rather than seller proﬁt, since our main design goal is to assure
that the capacity of the distribution network is not exceeded, and
that agents that need electricity most are allocated, rather than on
maximizing proﬁts.
2. RELATED WORK
Online mechanism design is an important topic in the multi-agent
and economics literature and there are several lines of research in
this ﬁeld. One of these aims to develop online variants of Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms [13, 7]. While these frame-
works are quite general, their focus is on (a slight strengthening
of) Bayesian-Nash incentive compatibility, whereas in this paper
we focus on the stronger concept of DSIC. Moreover, these works
rely on a model of future availability, as well as future supply (e.g.,
Parkes and Singh [13] use an MDP-type framework for predicting
future arrivals), while the mechanism proposed here is model-free.
Such models require fewer assumptions, and make computing allo-
cations more tractable than VCG-like approaches.
Model-free settings are considered by both Hajiaghayi et al. [8]
and Porter [14], who study the problem of online scheduling of
a single, re-usable resource over a ﬁnite time period. They char-
acterise truthful allocation rules for this setting and derive lower
bound competitive ratios. A limitation of this work [12, 8, 14] is
that they consider single-valued domains and, as we show, these ex-
isting approaches are no longer incentive compatible for our setting
where agents’ preferences are described by a vector of values.
Another related direction of work concerns designing truthful
multi-unit demand mechanisms for static settings. A seminal result
in this area is the sufﬁcient characterisation of DSIC in terms of
weak monotonicity (WMON) [1]. Although this work is relevant
toourmodel(webrieﬂydiscusstherelationshipbetweenourmech-
anism and WMON in Section 4.3), it does not propose any speciﬁc
mechanism, and, more importantly, existing results do not imme-
diately apply to online domains where agents arrive over time and
report their arrival and departure times, as well as their demand.
A different approach for dynamic problems is proposed by Juda
and Parkes [9]. They consider a mechanism in which agents are al-
located options (a right to buy) for the goods, instead of the goods
themselves, and agents can choose whether or not to exercise the
options when they exit the market. The concept of options would
need to be modiﬁed to our setting with perishable goods, with
power allocated and then burned so that the ﬁnal allocation reﬂects
only those options that would be allocated. It is not clear how our
online burning mechanism maps to their method.
In addition to theoretical results, several applications have been
suggested for online mechanisms, including: the allocation of Wi-
Fi bandwidth at Starbucks [6], scheduling of jobs on a server [14]
and the reservation of display space in online advertising [3]. How-
ever, this is the ﬁrst work that proposes an online mechanism for
electric vehicle charging, and we show how our theoretical frame-
work naturally maps into this domain.
3. EV CHARGING MODEL
In this section we present a model for our problem, formally deﬁn-
ing it as an online allocation problem.
(Supply) We consider a model with discrete and possibly inﬁnite
time steps (e.g., hourly slots) t ∈ T. At each time step, a number of
units of electricity are available for vehicle charging as described
by the supply function S : T → N
+
0 , where S(t) describes the
number of units available at time t. Supply can vary over time
due to changes in electricity demand for purposes other than vehi-
cle charging, as well as changeable supply from renewable energy
sources, such as wind and solar.
Importantly, we assume that all vehicle batteries are charged at
the same rate.
5 Thus, a unit of electricity corresponds to the total
energy consumed for charging a single vehicle in a single time step.
Note that, while there are multiple units of supply at each time
step (and agents have demand for multiple units), each agent can
be allocated at most a single unit per time step. These units are
allocated using a periodic multi-unit auction, one per time step.
Units of electricity are perishable, meaning that any unallocated
units at each time step will be lost.
(Agents and Preferences) Each vehicle owner is represented by
an agent. Let I = {1,...,n} denote the set of all agents. An agent
i’s(true)availabilityforchargingisgivenbyitsarrivaltimeai ∈ T
(i.e., the earliest possible time the vehicle can be plugged in), and
departure time di ≥ ai,di ∈ T (i.e., after which the vehicle is
needed by the owner). We will sometimes use Ti = {ai,...,di}
to indicate agent i’s availability and we say that agent i is active
in the market during this period. An agent has a positive value for
units allocated when the agent is active, and has zero value for any
units allocated outside of its active period. Furthermore, agents
have preferences which determine their value or utility for a certain
number of units of electricity. These preferences can change from
one agent to another, and depend on factors such as the efﬁciency of
the vehicle, travel distance, uncertainty in usage, battery capacity
and local fuel prices. Formally, preferences are described by a val-
uation vector vi = hvi,1,vi,2,...,vi,mii, where vi,k denotes the
marginal value for the k
th unit and mi is the maximum demand
from agent i. That is, vi,k = 0 for k > mi. We will often use
vi,k+1, which describes the value for the next unit when an agent
already has k units of electricity. Note that the agent is indifferent
5We believe that our approach can be extended to address settings
with variable charge rates, but leave this for future work.w.r.t. the precise allocation times, and merely cares about the total
number of units received over the entire active period. These com-
ponents together describe agent i’s type θi = hai,di,vii. We let
θ = {θ1,...,θn}, and θ−i is the types of all agents except i. We
will often use the notation (θi,θ−i) = θ.
We assume that agents have non-increasing marginal valuations,
i.e., vi,k ≥ 0 and vi,k+1 ≤ vi,k. As we will show in Section 5, this
assumption is realistic in a setting with plug-in hybrid and range-
extended EVs, where the more a vehicle battery is charged, the less
it needs to rely on the fuel-consuming internal combustion engine.
(Reports and Mechanism) Importantly, we allow agents the op-
portunity to misreport their types. Let ˆ θi = {ˆ ai, ˆ di, ˆ vi} denote an
agent’s report.
6 Given this, a mechanism takes the agents’ reported
(or observed) types as input as they enter the system, and based
on these reports determines the allocation of resources, as well as
the payments to the agents. Our goal is then to design a mech-
anism which incentivises truthful reporting. The decision policy
then speciﬁes an allocation π
hti
i (ˆ θ;k
hti) at each time point t ∈ T
and for each agent i ∈ I, where k
hti = (k
hti
1 ,...,k
hti
n ) denotes
the total endowments of the agents at time t before the start of the
auction at time t. That is:
k
hti
i =
t−1 X
t0=ˆ ai
π
ht0i
i
￿
ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i|k
ht0i
￿
.
The policy π is subject to the constraint that units can only be al-
located to agents within their reported activation period. In what
follows, we will use the abbreviated notation π
hti
i (ˆ θ), leaving any
dependence on the current endowments implicit. Furthermore, let
πi(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i) =
P ˆ di
t=ˆ ai π
hti
i (ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i)denotethetotalnumberofunits
allocated to agent i in its (reported) active time period. We will
sometimes omit the arguments when this is clear from the con-
text. Furthermore, the payment policy speciﬁes a payment func-
tion xi(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i|πi) for each agent i. Importantly, while allocations
occur at each time point t ∈ T (since units are perishable), pay-
ments are calculated at the reported departure time ˆ di (i.e., when
the owner physically unplugs the vehicle).
(Limited Misreports) As in [12], we assume that the agents
cannot report an earlier arrival, nor a later departure. Formally,
ˆ ai ≥ ai and ˆ di ≤ di, and we say such a pair hˆ ai, ˆ dii is admissible.
This is a valid assumption in our domain because the agent’s vehi-
cle has to be physically plugged into the system, and this cannot be
done if the vehicle is not available. However, it can still report an
earlier departure since the vehicle can be unplugged before the ve-
hicle is truly needed. Similarly, it can delay its effective arrival (i.e.,
after having arrived, the vehicle owner can delay actually plugging
in the vehicle).
(Agent Utility) Given its preferences, an agent’s utility by the
departure time is given by the valuation for its obtained units of
electricity, minus the payments to the mechanism. Formally:
ui(ˆ θi;θi) =
πi(ˆ θi,ˆ θ−i) X
k=1
vi,k − xi
￿
ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i|πi
￿
ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i
￿￿
(1)
6In practice, reported arrival and departure correspond to times
when the vehicle is physically plugged into, and, respectively, un-
plugged from the network (which could differ from when the vehi-
cle is truly available), which can typically be observed by the sys-
tem. This is because we use a greedy-like scheduling approach (see
Section 4) which does not require agents to report their types, nor
have knowledge of their true types, in advance. Consequently, it is
straightforward to apply our approach to settings where agents do
not know their exact availability or this changes due to unexpected
events.
agent 1
agent 2
agent 3
t=1 t=2
v1 = h10,4i
v2 = h5i
v3 = h2i
Figure 1: Example showing arrivals, departures, and valuation
vectors of 3 agents.
4. THE ONLINE MECHANISM
In this section we consider the problem of designing a model-free
mechanism for the above setting. Now, in the case of single-unit
demand, a simple greedy mechanism with an appropriate payment
policy is DSIC [12]. However, we will show through an example,
that this is no longer the case in a multi-unit demand setting that we
consider. A greedy allocation is formally deﬁned as follows:
DEFINITION 1 (GREEDY ALLOCATION). Ateachsteptallo-
cate the S(t) units to the active agents with the highest marginal
valuations, v
i,k
hti
i +1, where ties are broken randomly.
Consider the example with 2 time steps and 3 agents in Figure 1,
showing the agents’ arrival, departure and valuations. Suppose fur-
thermore that supply is S(t) = 1 at each time step. Greedy would
then allocate both units to agent 1, because agent 1 has the highest
marginal valuation in both auctions.
Now, consider the question of ﬁnding a payment scheme that
makes greedy allocation truthful. How much should agent 1 pay?
To answer this, note that the payment for the unit allocated at time
t = 1 has to be at least 5. Otherwise, if agent 1 were present in the
market only at time t = 1 and had a valuation v1,1 ∈ (5 − ￿,5),
it would not be truthful, because it could report ˆ v1,1 > 5 and still
win. Similarly, the payment for the unit allocated at time t = 2 has
to be at least 2. Thus, the minimum payment of agent 1 if allocated
2 units is x1(ˆ θ|π1 = 2) = 7.
On the other hand, how much should agent 1 pay if it were allo-
cated only 1 unit instead? We argue no more than 2. If x1(ˆ θ|π1 =
1) = 2 + ￿ (where ￿ > 0), then if the agent’s ﬁrst marginal value
was instead v1,1 ∈ (2,2 + ￿), with remaining marginal values
zero, then it would win in period 2, but it would pay 2 + ￿ and
hence have negative utility. However, if x1(ˆ θ|π1 = 2) ≥ 7 and
x1(ˆ θ|π1 = 1) ≤ 2, then agent 1 wants only 1 unit, not 2, as al-
located by the greedy mechanism (its utility for one unit is greater
than for two, as 10 − 2 > 10 + 4 − 7). Hence, online greedy
allocation cannot be made truthful.
7
In order to address this, in our mechanism we extend the Greedy
decisionpolicybyallowingthesystemtooccasionally“burn”units
of electricity when necessary, in order to maintain incentive com-
patibility. By burning we mean that this unit is not allocated to
any agent, even when there is local demand. We consider two ap-
proaches: immediate burning, where the decisions to leave a unit
unallocated is made at each time step before charging, and on-
departure burning, where allocated units can be reclaimed by the
system when the agent leaves the market (i.e., the corresponding
amount of electricity is discharged from the battery on departure).
Each of these approaches has their own advantages and disad-
vantages. Burning on departure generally requires burning fewer
units in some cases, and thus it leads to a higher efﬁciency. More-
over, the current method we use to determine payments for im-
mediate burning can have a computational cost exponential in the
7Formally, this is because the decision policy violates a property
called weak monotonicity [1]. In this paper, we omit a detailed
discussion of this relationship, due to space restrictions.number of the agents present, whereas for on-departure burning,
the cost of determining payments is linear. However, in terms of
the application domain, fast discharging of a vehicle’s battery may
not be practical.
Note that, for both approaches, the energy that is burnt is not
necessarily wasted, but it is simply returned to the grid, to be used
for other purposes than electric vehicle charging. For immediate
burning, the unallocated electricity units are returned to the grid
before it is actually charged by the agent. For the mechanism with
on-departure burning, units may be charged ﬁrst and then rapidly
discharged when the agent leaves the market. While this may result
in some loss, this is probably negligible w.r.t. the overall amount of
electricity allocated.
4.1 The Mechanism
Before we introduce the decision policy, we show how we can
compute a set of threshold values, which are used both to calcu-
late the payments and to decide when to burn a unit of electricity.
Let k
hti
−i,j =
Pt−1
t0=aj π
ht0i
j (θ−i) denote the endowment of an active
agent j at start time t, under the allocation we would have in the
absence of agent i (note that calculating this value requires recom-
puting allocations without agent i in the market from ai until the
current time t). Then v
j,k
hti
−i,j+1 is the marginal valuation of agent
j at time t in the absence of agent i. Given this, we deﬁne v
(n)
−i,t to
be the n
th highest of such valuations from all active agents j 6= i.
Then v
(S(t))
−i,t , for supply S(t), is the lowest value that is still allo-
cated a unit at time t, if agent i were not present. Henceforth, we
refer to v
(S(t))
−i,t as the marginal clearing value for agent i in period
t, and we will often use v−i,t = v
(S(t))
−i,t for brevity.
Now, let p
hti
−i = incr(v−i,ai,v−i,ai+1,...v−i,t) denote agent
i’s price vector at time t, where ai is the reported arrival time of
agentiandincr(.)isanoperatorwhichtakesavectorofrealvalues
as input and returns it in increasing order. In addition, let p−i =
p
hdii
−i denote the value of this vector at time di when agent i leaves
the market.
Intuitively, in any round t, the price p
t
−i,k that agent i is charged
for the k-th unit is the minimum valuation the agent could report
for the k-th unit and win it by time t, given the greedy allocation
policy with burning described below. Given this, the decision and
payment policies of our mechanism are as follows.
• Decision Policy The decision consists of two stages.
Stage 1 At each time point t, pre-allocate using Greedy (see
Deﬁnition 1).
Stage 2 We consider two variations in terms of when to de-
cide to burn pre-allocated units:
– Immediate Burning. Burn a unit whenever:
v
i,k
hti
i +1 < p
hti
−i,k
hti
i +1
– On-Departure Burning. This type of burning occurs
on reported departure. For each departing agent, burn
any unit k ≤ πi where vi,k < p−i,k.
• PaymentPolicyPaymentoccursonreporteddeparture. Given
that πi units are allocated to agent i at time t = ˆ di, the pay-
ment collected from i is:
xi(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i|πi) =
Xπi
k=1
p−i,k (2)
Burning occurs whenever the marginal value for an additional unit
is smaller than the marginal payment for that unit. Thus these val-
ues are effectively agent-speciﬁc threshold values, below which no
agent 1: agent 2: agent 3:
T1 = {1,2,3} T2 = {1} T3 = {2,3}
v1 = h10,4i v2 = h5i v3 = h2i
t = 1 k
h1i
1 = 0 k
h1i
2 = 0
v−1,1 = 5 v−2,1 = 10
p
h1i
−1 = h5i p
h1i
−2 = h10i
π
h1i
1 = 1 π
h1i
2 = 0
t = 2 k
h2i
1 = 1 k
h2i
3 = 0
v−1,2 = 2 v−3,2 = 4
p
h2i
−1 = h2,5i p
h2i
−3 = h4i
π
h2i
1 = 0 (IM) π
h2i
3 = 0
π
h2i
1 = 1 (OD)
t = 3 k
h3i
1 = 1 k
h3i
3 = 0
IM v−1,3 = 0 v−3,3 = 4
p
h3i
−1 = h0,2,5i p
h3i
−3 = h4,4i
π
h3i
1 = 1 π
h3i
3 = 0
t = 3 k
h3i
1 = 2 k
h3i
3 = 0
OD v−1,3 = 0 v−3,3 = 0
p
h3i
−1 = h0,2,5i p
h3i
−3 = h0,4i
π
h3i
1 = 0 π
h3i
3 = 1
Table 1: Example run of the mechanism with 3 agents and 3
time periods for immediate (IM) and on-departure (OD) burn-
ing. GreycellsindicatedifferentvaluesforIMandODburning.
unit is allocated to that agent. Moreover, it is important to note that
the mechanism used for computing the prices mirrors the actual al-
location mechanism. So, for example, if immediate burning is used
in the decision policy, then for each agent i and for all times t, the
values of the p
hti
−i vector are computed by re-running the market,
in the absence of agent i using immediate burning, based on the
reports of the other agents. Conversely, if on-departure burning is
used for the decision policy, the same mechanism should be used
in computing the p−i prices.
4.2 Example
To demonstrate how the mechanism works, we extend the previous
example shown in Figure 1 to include a third time step, t = 3. Both
agents 1 and 3 remain in the market at t = 3 (i.e., d1 = d3 = 3)
and no new agents arrive. Furthermore, S(t) = 1 in t ∈ {1,2,3},
and so there are now 3 units to be allocated in total. Table 1 shows
the endowments k
hti
i , the marginal clearing values v−i,t, the p
hti
−i
vectors, and the allocation decisions π
hti
i at different time periods.
We start by considering the allocations and payment using imme-
diate burning. At time t = 1, Stage 1 of the mechanism allocates
the unit to agent 1, and since v1,1 = 10 ≥ p
h1i
−1,1 = 5, this unit is
not burnt in the second stage. At time t = 2, the unit again gets
pre-allocated to agent 1 since v1,2 = 4 > v3,1 = 2. However,
the marginal clearing value v−1,2 is inserted at the beginning of the
p
h2i
−1 vector, and as a result v1,2 = 4 < p
h2i
−1,2 = 5. Consequently,
this unit gets burnt and is allocated to neither of the agents. At
time t = 3, therefore, the marginal value of agent 1 is still 4 (since
its endowment is unchanged), and this value is added to agent 3’s
marginal clearing values. To calculate the marginal clearing value
of agent 1, recall that the decision policy needs to be recomputed
with agent 1 entirely removed from the market. In that case agent
3 would have been allocated a unit at time t = 2, and thus at time
t = 3 the marginal value of this agent is 0. Thus, the value of 0
is inserted in the p
h3i
−i vector. At t = 3, since agent 1 still has the
highest marginal value, it is again pre-allocated the unit. However,
now v1,2 = 4 ≥ p
h3i
−1,2 = 2, and therefore the unit is not burnt. So,
in case of immediate burning, 2 out of 3 units are allocated to agent1, and that agent pays p
h3i
−1,1 + p
h3i
−1,2 = 2.
Now consider the same setting but with on-departure burning.
Theﬁrsttwotimestepsareasbefore, exceptthatthereisnoburning
at t = 2 (since this will be done on departure if needed). This
changes the endowment state of agent 1 at t = 3, and therefore the
marginal value of agent 1 at t = 3 is equal to v1,3 = 0. Therefore,
the unit is allocated to agent 3, and the payment for this unit is
p−3,1 = 0. The vector p
h3i
−1 remains unchanged compared to the
immediate burning case. At this point, there is no longer a need
to burn one of the units of agent 1, since it has received k = 2
units, the same allocation as with immediate burning, and note that
v1,2 > p−1,2.
Still, it is possible to construct examples where, both with on-
departure and immediate burning, half of the units need to be burnt.
Furthermore, note that this unit cannot go to agent 3, because pay-
ment would have been p
h3i
−3,1 = 4, which would result in a negative
utility for agent 3.
4.3 Properties
In this section we prove that the above mechanism is DSIC. We
will ﬁrst establish DSIC with respect to valuations only, and prove
truthful reporting of arrival and departure times separately. In more
detail, we proceed in the following 3 stages: (i) We deﬁne the con-
cept of a threshold policy, and show that, when coupled with an
appropriate payment function, and given any admissible pair hˆ ai,
ˆ dii, if a decision policy is a threshold policy, then the mechanism
isDSICwithrespecttothevaluations(Lemma1). (ii)Weshowthat
our decision policy is a threshold policy (Lemma 2). (iii) Finally,
we show that, if agents truthfully report their valuations, reporting
ˆ ai = ai, ˆ di = di is a weakly dominant strategy (Lemma 3). These
results are combined in Theorem 1 to show that our policy is DSIC.
DEFINITION 2 (THRESHOLD POLICY). A decision policy π
is a threshold policy if, for a given agent i with ﬁxed hˆ ai, ˆ dii and
ˆ θ−i, there exists a marginally non-decreasing threshold vector τ,
independent fromthereport ˆ vi made by agenti, suchthatfollowing
holds: ∀k, ˆ vi: πi(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i) ≥ k if and only if ˆ vi,k ≥ τk.
Inotherwords, athresholdpolicyhasa(potentiallydifferent)thresh-
old τk for each k, such that agent i will receive at least k units if
and only if its (reported) valuation for the k
th item is at least τk.
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Importantly, the vector τ has to be non-decreasing, i.e., τk+1 ≥
τk, and should be independent of the reported valuation vector ˆ vi.
Note that both of these properties are satisﬁed by the p−i vector,
and we will use this to show that our mechanism is a threshold
policy. First, however, we show that a threshold policy with appro-
priate payments is DSIC with respect to the valuations.
LEMMA 1. Fixing admissible hˆ a, ˆ di and ˆ θ−i, if π is a threshold
policy coupled with a payment policy:
xi(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i) =
Pπi(ˆ θi,ˆ θ−i)
k=1 τk,
then if vi is marginally non-increasing, reporting vi truthfully is a
weakly dominant strategy.
8A threshold policy satisﬁes weak-monotonicity (WMON) [1], and
is therefore sufﬁcient for truthfulness in this domain since we have
bounded agent valuations and the domain is completely ordered,
meaning that all payoff types agree on the same weak preference
ordering on all allocations (i.e., more is always weakly better than
less), and indifference to the way goods are allocated to other
agents. We show that our decision policy has the threshold prop-
erty, and thus the WMON, and that it also handles misreports of
arrivals and departures.
PROOF. Agent i’s utility can be rewritten as:
ui(ˆ θi;θi) =
Pπi(ˆ θi,ˆ θ−i)
k=1 (vi,k − τk)
Since τ is independent of ˆ vi, agent i can only potentially bene-
ﬁt by changing the allocation, πi(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i). Since the values of
τk+1 ≥ τk (non-decreasing threshold vector) and vi,k+1 ≤ vi,k
(non-increasing marginal values), by deﬁnition 2 we have vi,k −
τk ≥ 0 for any k ≤ πi(θi) and vi,k − τk ≥ 0 for any k > πi(θi).
Suppose that, by misreporting agent i is allocated πi(ˆ θi) > πi(θi),
then ui(ˆ θi;θi) < ui(θi;θi) since:
Pπi(ˆ θi,ˆ θ−i)
k=πi(θi,ˆ θ−i)+1(vi,k − τk) < 0
Similarly, misreporting such that πi(ˆ θi, ˆ θ−i) < πi(θi, ˆ θ−i) results
in ui(ˆ θi;θi) < ui(θi;θi) since:
Pπi(θi,ˆ θ−i)
k=πi(ˆ θi,ˆ θ−i)+1(vi,k − τk) ≥ 0
If misreporting has no effect on the allocation, the utility remains
the same. Therefore, there is no incentive for agent i to misreport
its valuations.
Note that Greedy (as per Deﬁnition 1) is not a threshold policy.
To see this, consider the example from Figure 1. As we saw earlier,
Greedy allocates 2 units to agent 1, and the required threshold τ2
for winning the second unit is 2 (below which Greedy would allo-
cate 1 unit). However, if agent 1 had valuation v1 = h4,4i, Greedy
would allocate only 1 unit, even though v2 > τ2, which conﬂicts
with the requirement of a threshold policy.
The next lemma shows that the threshold condition holds if we
include burning, and if we set the threshold values to τk = p−i,k.
LEMMA 2. Given non-increasing marginal valuations, the de-
cision policy π in Section 4.1 is (for either burning policy) a thresh-
old policy where τk = p−i,k.
PROOF. First, from the deﬁnition of vector p
hti
−i and p−i from
Section 4.1, the values of p
hti
−i are independent of the reports ˆ vi
made by agent i. This is because each of its component values
v−i,ai,...v−i,t are computed based only on the reports of the
other agents, by ﬁrst removing agent i from the market.
Second, we need to show two inequalities, thus the proof is done
in two parts. Part 1: Whenever vi,k ≥ p−i,k, πi allocates at least
k units to agent i. Part 2: Whenever vi,k < p−i,k, πi allocates
strictly less than k units to agent i.
Part 1: Let vi,k ≥ p−i,k. Suppose that agent i has the same
marginal values, vi,k, for the ﬁrst k units (i.e., vi,1 = vi,2 = ... =
vi,k), then it will win exactly those auctions where vi,k ≥ v−i,t,
t ∈ Ti in Stage 1 of the mechanism (ignoring tie breaking). Note
that even when, by winning an auction, agent i displaces the losing
marginal valuetoafutureauction, sincethisvalue islessorequalto
vi,k, it will not affect the future auctions for agent i since it will still
outbid that agent in the next auction. Now, because p−i,j ≤ p−i,k
for j ≤ k (by deﬁnition), there must be at least k auctions where
p−i,k ≥ v−i,t in the period t ∈ T, and since vi,k ≥ p−i,k, agent i
wins at least k auctions in Stage 1.
Furthermore, each time an auction is won, the clearing values
appear as one of the j ﬁrst elements of the p
t
−i vector, where j is
the number of auctions so far (since these are the auctions with the
lowest clearing values, and the clearing values are ordered ascend-
ingly). Because agent i wins an auction in Stage 1 if and only if
vi,k ≥ v−i,t, it follows that vi,k = vi,j ≥ p−i,j whenever it wins
an auction in Stage 1. Therefore, there is no burning in Stage 2.The above holds if agent i has uniform marginal values of vi,k
for the ﬁrst k units. In fact, however, because of non-increasing
valuations, we have vi,j ≥ vi,k, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and thus the
decision policy will allocate at least k units to agent i.
Part 2: Let vi,k < p−i,k. First consider the on-departure burn-
ing case. As per the deﬁnition of Stage 2 of the mechanism, unit
k is burnt. However, we still need to show that any units j > k
are burnt as well. Since p−i,j ≥ p−i,k and v−i,j ≤ v−i,k for all
j > k, it follows that vi,j < p−i,j for all j > k. Therefore even
if Stage 1 allocates k or more units, these will be burnt in Stage 2,
and thus strictly less than k units remain.
Now consider the immediate burning case. Note that p−i,k ≤
p
hti
−i,k for (ai + k − 1) ≤ t ≤ di. That is, threshold values can
only decrease over time. Thus it follows that v−i,k < p
hti
−i,k for
any (ai + k − 1) ≤ t ≤ di. Consider a case where, at time tk, the
k
th unit is allocated in Stage 1. Because v−i,k < p
htki
−i,k, this unit
will always be burnt in Stage 2 of the decision policy. Therefore,
the ﬁnal result is an allocation of strictly less than k units.
By setting τk = p−i,k, the payment function in Equation 2 corre-
sponds to the payment function in Lemma 1. Therefore the pro-
posed mechanism is shown to be DSIC in valuations. We now
complete the proof by showing that truthful reporting of the ar-
rival and departure times are also DSIC (given limited misreports),
given truthful reporting of vi.
LEMMA 3. Given limited misreports, and assuming that truth-
fully reporting ˆ vi = vi is a dominant strategy for any given pair
of arrival/departure reports hˆ ai, ˆ dii, then it is a dominant strategy
to report ˆ ai = ai and ˆ di = di.
PROOF. Let p
hˆ ai, ˆ dii
−i denote the vector of increasingly ordered
marginal clearing values (computed without i), given the agent re-
ports ˆ θi = hˆ ai, ˆ di,vii. By reporting type ˆ θi, the agent is allocated
πi(ˆ θi) items, and its total payment is:
Pπi(ˆ θi)
j=1 p
hˆ ai, ˆ dii
−i,j . For each
agent i, misreporting from θi to ˆ θi results in one of two cases:
πi(ˆ θi) = πi(θi): Misreporting by agent i has no affect on the
marginal clearing values v−i,t, but can only decrease the size of
the p−i vector. In particular, due to limited misreports we have
ˆ ai ≥ ai and ˆ di ≤ di, and thus p
hˆ ai, ˆ dii
−i contains a subset of the ele-
mentsfromp
hai,dii
−i . Asthesevectorsarebydeﬁnitionincreasingly
ordered, it follows that p
hˆ ai, ˆ dii
−i,j ≥ p
hai,dii
−i,j ,∀j ≤ (ˆ di − ˆ ai + 1).
Since the payment consists of the ﬁrst ki = ˆ ki elements, this can
only increase by misreporting.
πi(ˆ θi) 6= πi(θi): First, we show that πi(ˆ θi) > πi(θi) could
never occur. Since the marginal clearing values remain the same,
butthenumberofauctionsinwhichtheagentparticipatesdecreases
by misreporting, Stage 1 of the mechanism can only allocate fewer
or equal items. Furthermore, since p
hˆ ai, ˆ dii
−i,j ≥ p
hai,dii
−i,j , the possi-
bility of burning can only increase in Stage 2. Thus, it always holds
that πi(ˆ θi) ≤ πi(θi).
Now, we consider the case πi(ˆ θi) < πi(θi). First, as shown for
the case πi(ˆ θi) = πi(θi) above, we know that
Pπi(ˆ θi)
j=1 p
hai,dii
−i,j ≤
Pπi(ˆ θi)
j=1 p
hˆ ai, ˆ dii
−i,k (i.e., the payment for those units won can only in-
crease by misreporting arrival and/or departure). Furthermore, we
know that the allocation πi(θi) is preferable to any other alloca-
tion πi(ˆ θi) < πi(θi), otherwise reporting the true valuation vector
vi would not be a dominant strategy. Since the payment for these
items is potentially even higher when misreporting, the agent can-
not beneﬁt by winning fewer items.
We are now ready to present the main theoretical result:
THEOREM 1. Given non-increasing marginal valuations and
limited misreports, Greedy with on-departure and immediate burn-
ing and with payment function according to Equation 2 are DSIC.
PROOF. The proof of this theorem follows directly from the
above lemmas. Lemmas 1 and 2 show that, for any pair of ar-
rival/departure(mis)-reportshˆ ai ˆ diithedecisionpolicyistruthfulin
terms of the valuation vector vi, given an appropriate payment pol-
icy. Furthermore, the payments in Equation 2 correspond to those
in Lemma 2, and therefore they truthfully implement the mecha-
nism. Finally, Lemma 3 completes this reasoning, by showing that
for a truthful report of valuation vector vi, agents cannot beneﬁt by
misreporting arrivals/departures.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our proposed mechanism empirically.
In doing so, we seek to answer a number of pertinent questions.
First, since our greedy approach does not generally ﬁnd the opti-
mal allocation, we are interested in how close it comes to this in
realistic settings. Second, we investigate the extent to which unit
burning occurs in practice (i.e., how often units of electricity need
to be burned by our decision policies, in order to ensure truthful-
ness). This is critical, as it may negatively affect efﬁciency. Finally,
we compare our mechanism to a range of simpler truthful mecha-
nisms that employ ﬁxed pricing, as well as to a well-known online
scheduling approach. These serve as benchmarks for our mecha-
nism — ﬁxed pricing is a common mechanism for selling goods in
a wide range of settings, while the scheduling approach highlights
what a non-truthful mechanism could achieve.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup is based on data collected during the ﬁrst
large-scale UK trial of EVs. In December 2009, 25 EVs were pro-
vided to members of the public as part of the CABLED (Coventry
And Birmingham Low Emissions Demonstration) project.
9 The
aim of this trial was to investigate real-world usage patterns of
EVs. To this end, they were equipped with GPS and data loggers
to record comprehensive usage information, such as trip durations
and distances, home charging patterns and energy consumption.
We use the data published by this project for the ﬁrst quarter
of 2010 to realistically simulate typical behaviour patterns. More
speciﬁcally, in each of our experiments, we simulate a single 24
hour day, where charging periods are divided into hourly time in-
tervals. For the purpose of the experiments, a simulated day starts
at 15:00, as vehicle owners begin to arrive back from work. To de-
termine the arrival time of each agent, we randomly draw samples
from the home charging start times reported by the project. These
are highest after 18:00 and then quickly drop off during the night.
Likewise, to simulate departures, we sample from data recording
journey start times.
In order to simulate realistic marginal valuation vectors for the
agents, we combine data from the project about journey distances
with a principled approach for calculating the expected economic
beneﬁt of vehicle charging. In particular, we can calculate the ex-
pected utility of a given amount of charge (in kWh), ce, given a
price of fuel (in £/litre), pp, an internal combustion engine efﬁ-
ciency (in miles/litre), ep, an electric efﬁciency (in miles/kWh), ee,
and a probability density function, p(m), that describes the dis-
tance to be driven the next day:
E(u(ce)) =
Z ∞
0
pp
ep
·m·p(m)dm−
Z ∞
ce·ee
pp
ep
·m·p(m)dm, (3)
9See http://cabled.org.uk/.where the ﬁrst term is the expected fuel cost without any charge,
and the second term is the expected cost with a battery charge of
ce. Given this, and a charging rate (in kW), re, it is straight-forward
to calculate the marginal valuation of the kth hour of charging time:
vk = E(u(k · re)) − E(u((k − 1) · re)).
To generate a variety of marginal valuations, we note that ee
and ep depend on the speciﬁc make and type of the EV and thus
vary between households, while p(m) depends on the driving be-
haviour of the car owner. We draw ee uniformly at random from
2 – 4 miles/kWh and ep is drawn from 9 – 18 miles/litre. Further-
more, we create p(m) from daily driving distances presented in the
CABLED report. These distances are typically short, with a daily
mean of 23 miles, but the distribution has a long tail with a maxi-
mum of 101 miles. Next, we draw the capacity of a car battery from
15 – 25 kWh and set the charging rate to 3 kW. These and earlier
speciﬁcations are all based on the Chevrolet Volt, the ﬁrst mass-
produced range-extended EV to be on the road in 2011. However,
we include some variance to account for other vehicle types.
Finally, to derive the supply function S, we consider a realis-
tic neighbourhood-based supply function using the average energy
consumption of a UK household over time.
10 In this setting, the to-
tal energy available for charging depends on the number of house-
holds in the neighbourhood and the constraints of the local trans-
former. Hence, available supply during the night is signiﬁcantly
higher than during the day. Furthermore, we tested a range of other
supply functions and valuation distributions, where we observed
the same general trends as discussed in the remainder of this sec-
tion. However, we omit the details here for brevity.
5.2 Benchmark Mechanisms
In addition to the two decision policies developed within this paper
— Greedy with Immediate Burning (Immediate) and Greedy with
On-Departure Burning (On-Departure) — we benchmark the fol-
lowing strategies that have been widely applied in similar settings:
Fixed Price allocates units to those agents that value them higher
than a ﬁxed price p. The price they pay for this unit is p. When de-
mand is greater than supply, units are allocated randomly between
all agents with a sufﬁciently high valuation. This mechanism is
DSIC and so it constitutes a direct comparison to our mechanisms.
However, to optimise the performance of the ﬁxed price mecha-
nism, p must be carefully chosen. Thus, we test all possible values
(in steps of £0.01) and select the p that achieves the highest average
efﬁciency (over 1000 trials) for a given setting. Thus, when show-
ing the results of Fixed Price, this constitutes an upper bound of
what could be achieved with this mechanism. We use the special
case p = 0 as a baseline benchmark and denote this as Random.
Heuristic allocates units such that a weighted combination of an
agent’s valuation and urgency (proximity to its departure time) is
maximised. Here, an α ∈ [0,1] parameter denotes the importance
of the urgency, such that α = 1 corresponds to the well-known
earliest-deadline-ﬁrst heuristic in scheduling, while α = 0 indi-
cates that units are always allocated to the agent with the highest
valuation. This is not a truthful mechanism and we do not impose
payments here, as its primary purpose is as a benchmark for our
approach. Again, we always select the best α.
Optimal allocates units to agents to maximise the overall alloca-
tionefﬁciency, assumingcomplete knowledgeoffuturearrivalsand
supply. Clearly, this mechanism is not practical and it is also not
truthful (again we impose no payments), but it serves as an upper
bound for the efﬁciency that could be achieved.
Having described the valuation calculation, the experimental set-
ting, and the benchmarks, we now describe our results.
10We use the average evaluated during a work day in winter, avail-
able at http://www.elexon.co.uk/.
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Figure 2: Results for a small neighbourhood with 30 houses (a)
and a large one with 200 houses (b).
5.3 Results
Forourexperiments, weconsidertwopossibleneighbourhoodsizes
— one with 30 households and one with 200 households. In these
settings, the capacity of the local transformer is constrained, so that
only a couple of cars can charge at the same time in the 30 house-
holdcaseandupto16with200households. Wechoosesuchhighly
constrained settings here, because they are intrinsically more chal-
lenging and interesting than settings where all cars can be fully
charged overnight. Across the experiments, we vary the number
of these households that own an EV. Note here that we only show
results for Immediate burning up to 15 agents, because our current
implementation of this is computationally expensive. This is be-
cause the vector of marginal clearing values p
hti
−i at time t depends
on which units are burned in i’s absence (and as this vector is used
to determine when burning takes place, it recursively depends on
the corresponding vectors of all agents that are allocated in i’s ab-
sence). Thus, we may potentially need to evaluate all subsets of
agents, which grows exponentially with n. Although it may be
possible to prune the search space efﬁciently in practice, we leave
these computational aspects to future work. It is interesting that
this does not apply to On-Departure burning, because here burning
does not inﬂuence the agents’ marginal clearing values.
The results for both settings are given in Figure 2. First, the top
row shows the average
11 efﬁciency, normalised to the performance
of Optimal (when there are more than 30 EV owners, Optimal be-
comes intractable and so we normalise results to the performance
ofHeuristicinthosecasesasacloseapproximation). Here, wenote
that our two burning policies consistently outperform (or match) all
other truthful benchmarks. The improvement compared to Random
is particularly pronounced, but our approach still achieves a sig-
niﬁcant improvement over the Fixed Price mechanism. For small
neighbourhoods, this is almost 10%, while in larger neighbour-
11All results are averaged over 1000 trials. We plot 95% conﬁdence
intervals, and signiﬁcant differences reported are at t < 0.05 level.hoods, it is up to 5%. This is a promising result, because setting
the optimal price for the ﬁxed price strategy requires knowledge
about the distributions of agents types, but our approach makes no
such assumptions.
This improvement is due the ability of our mechanism to allocate
the agents with the highest marginal valuations, while Fixed Price
randomises over those that meet its price. Our approach is also
responsive to changes in demand over time, consistently allocating
units even when the highest valuations are low. In contrast, Fixed
Price must be tuned to operate at any particular balance of supply
and demand. Thus, it does not allocate when its price is unmet. It
performs better in the larger setting because it is more likely that at
least some of the agents meet the ﬁxed price in this case.
Next, our mechanism also performs close to the Optimal and
Heuristic, consistently achieving 95% or better, which indicates
that our greedy approach performs well in realistic settings even
without having access to complete information (such as departure
times or even future arrivals). The lowest relative efﬁciency to the
optimal is achieved when there are few EVs (about 20% of the
neighbourhood). Here, scheduling constraints are most critical,
as it may sometimes be optimal to prioritise an agent with lower
valuations over one with higher valuations, but a longer deadline.
This becomes less critical when there are more agents, as there are
typically sufﬁciently many with high valuations. Finally, we see
that Immediate burning achieves a slightly lower average efﬁciency
than On-Departure. This is due to higher levels of burning, but the
difference is small (and, in fact, not statistically signiﬁcant).
In the second row of Figure 2, the average utility of each EV
owner’s allocation (not including the payments to the mechanism)
is shown. This corresponds directly to the fuel costs that a single
EV owner saves by using electricity instead of fuel. Initially, this is
high (around £2), as there is little competition, but starts dropping
as more EV owners compete for the same amount of electricity. Of
key interest here is the horizontal separation between the different
mechanisms. For a given fuel saving per agent, our mechanism
can sustain a signiﬁcantly larger number of agents than the other
incentive-compatible mechanisms. For example, to save at least
£1 per agent in the small neighbourhood, Random can support up
to 10 EV owners, while Immediate and On-Departure achieve the
same threshold for up to 14 EV owners (a 40% improvement). In
the large neighbourhood, our mechanism can support around 60
additional vehicles in some cases (to achieve a £0.65 threshold).
Finally, the last row shows the average number of units that are
burned by our two decision policies, as a percentage of the overall
(tentatively) allocated units. Again, due to computational limita-
tions, full results for the Immediate burning policy are only shown
up to 15 agents. For up to 18 agents, results from only 100 trials
are shown (resulting in larger conﬁdence intervals). On-Departure
burning clearly burns signiﬁcantly fewer units than Immediate, as
the latter sometimes unnecessarily burns units. There is also a
clear maximum in the number of burned units when around 20%
of households are EV owners. This is because there is a signif-
icant amount of competition, with many agents that have similar
marginal valuations, and this induces burning. However, when the
number of agents rises further, burning drops again. This is be-
cause agents are increasingly less likely to be allocated more than
a single unit in these very competitive settings and so there is no
need for burning. It should be noted that burning is generally low
(for On-Departure burning), with typically only 1-2% of allocated
units being burned (and always less than 10%).
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a novel online allocation mechanism for a
problem that is of great practical interest for the smart grid com-
munity, that of integrating EVs into the electricity grid. Our contri-
bution to existing literature is two-fold. On the theoretical side, we
extend model-free, online mechanism design with perishable goods
to handle multi-unit demand with decreasing marginal valuations.
On the practical side, we empirically evaluate our mechanism
in a real-world setting, and showed that the proposed mechanism
is highly robust, and achieves better allocative efﬁciency than any
ﬁxed-price benchmark, while only being slightly suboptimal w.r.t.
an established cooperative scheduling heuristic.
For future work we plan to look at several issues. First, in this
paper we assumed all EVs have a uniform charging rate, but in the
future we plan to extend the allocation model to deal with heteroge-
neous maximal charging rates (corresponding to different types of
EVs). Second, it would be interesting to compare the performance
of the model-free online mechanism proposed in this paper to a
model-based approach, such as the one in [13]. Finally, this paper
looked at performance in terms of a realistic application scenario,
but we also plan to study the worst-case bounds on allocative efﬁ-
ciency and number of items our mechanism burns in future work.
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